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Paul Simard Smith’s paper is a neatly argued conceptual analysis of how two different 
approaches to inquiry—monism and agnostic pluralism—might be prone to a special type of 
bias, dialectical bias, in the course of argumentative discussion. The end result is what seems to 
be an empirically verifiable hypothesis: “an inquirer that possesses an agnostic pluralist stance 
towards a phenomenon X is less prone to dialectical bias than an inquirer that adopts a monist 
stance towards X” (p. 9). Is this hypothesis clear, well-justified, indeed important? This is what 
my comments will focus on.  
A note: In my comments I will clearly be dialectically biased and thus direct more 
cognitive effort towards unclear or weak points of Paul’s paper—without, I hope, undermining 
its merits. 
 
2. Pluralism about bias  
 
I will begin by presenting the simplest possible framework for analysing bias in (dialectical) 
argumentation (see Figure 1). There are three elements to it: 1) the performance of individual 
arguers, itself a combination of effort, attitude and skill (both acquired and inherited). The right 
management of cognitive effort, cultivation of critical attitudes and acquisition of relevant skills 
are the key domains of the critical thinking movement; 2) the process or procedure for 
argumentation; this is what the performance is employed in. Dialectically-oriented theories 
design and test procedures, while rhetorical approaches focus on processes; 3) the final product 
of argumentation; this is what the performance is employed for. Various logical approaches look 
carefully into that.  
Clearly, like in any input-output system, everybody is right to care about the final output, 
the product. But how do we get there? Well, we need to perform some piece of reasoning; and, 
apart from the much-favoured but probably rare cases of purely individual reasoning, we do this 
reasoning with others through some kind of a process or procedure; that is, we perform 
argumentation. The product thus is a resultant of our performance within a procedure. Then, 
what is our focus? The former or the latter?  
Well, we do not need to be monist about it. There are clearly individual biases, such as 
when someone knew all along it was going to happen (the hindsight bias). There are also 
procedural or even systemic biases, such as when a decision-procedure starts with an 
authoritative statement of an all-powerful boss, followed by his: “Any objections? Well, then, on 
to the next point.” Both types of biases can be mitigated by either individual or procedural 
techniques—so we get four basic scenarios:  
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a) individual bias – individual mitigation: a racist committee member is  
 advised to take a course on the terrors of White colonialism and the value  
 of multi-culturalism;  
b) individual bias – procedural mitigation: a racist committee member is part 
 of an anonymous assessment of candidates’ merits; 
c) procedural bias – individual mitigation: the boss promises himself not to  
 be so bossy in his opening statements, even if the rules require him to  
 always give them. He works on it. 
d) procedural bias – procedural mitigation: the company changes the  
 procedure—the boss’s statement only presents a problem without   
 suggesting solutions; these are then anonymously collected and discussed  
 freely without any member claiming authorship of the solution.  
 
Figure 1: The simplest possible framework for analysing bias in (dialectical) argumentation 
 
I think Paul’s work falls squarely into the scenario c: the procedural, dialectical bias can be 
mitigated by a pluralist stance adopted by individual reasoners. I take it not to be a case of an 
undue limitation, but rather his deliberate focus. His starting point is the problem of a dialectical 
bias in the course of argumentative discussions, so obviously only scenarios c and d are relevant 
here. How about the solution? Paul is well aware—due to the work of Kenyon and Beaulac 
(2014), at least—that various levels of bias-mitigation can be employed, from the most 
individualistic (Kenyon & Beaulac’s level 1) to most systemic or procedural (level 4). Since 
Kenyon and Beaulac (2014) are highly suspicious of the actual efficiency of level 1 de-biasing, 
they tend to orient “towards debiasing decisions, actions, and outcomes—including group 
outcomes—without specific reference to the dispositional properties of any particular agent” (p. 
353). Accordingly, they focus on what they repeatedly call “bias-reducing infrastructure,” 
“environment,” “policies and organizational structures” or shortly “institutions.” That is clearly 
our scenario d. To what extent is this form of mitigation compatible with Paul’s scenario c 
mitigation? And how are they connected? Is the pluralist stance exclusively an attitudinal 
characteristic of an individual, or can it be enshrined in our procedures for argument-based 
inquiry?   
These questions require some insight into “contextual engineering that effectively 
debiases” (Kenyon & Beaulac, 2014, p. 355). In the schema presented in Figure 1, it requires a 
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shift from arguers’ performance to processes/procedures of argumentation or, in Paul’s words, 
into “the context of an argumentative discussion.”  
 
3. Pluralism about argumentative discussion  
 
I think the weakest point of Paul’s paper is precisely the under-definition of the term 
argumentative discussion. And also a surprising point, given the precise definitions of the 
notions of dialectical bias, dialectical obligation, or dialectical pressure. But these terms are 
clearly related. Shortly, different types of argumentative discussion generate very different types 
of obligations, pressures and possibly biases. Examples are too many to even run through them 
in this short commentary. For instance: Is the arguer obliged to abandon her claim once strong 
counter-arguments are given, or can she revise it and still defend? Are commitments to given 
theoretical or empirical claims fixed, or can they be modified or retracted? Is contradiction a 
game over, or is it a stimulus for dissociation, more precision and further arguments? Walton and 
Krabbe (1995) formally define two “systems of dialogue rules”—Rigorous Persuasion Dialogue 
and Permissive Persuasion Dialogue—along the lines hinted above (Ch. 4). The strict 
obligations belong to the rules of the RPD, while the somewhat looser to the PPD. Both types of 
dialogue are perfectly legitimate members of the set of argumentative discussions, but they 
would generate very different pressures and obligations.  
 Indeed, some dialogue types seem to be conducive to cultivate the pluralist stance by 
design, so to speak. Blair (2016), for one, distinguishes open inquiry, where proposals are freely 
advanced and collaboratively discussed, from adversarial advocacy, where arguers are bound to 
defend their positions. Inquiry seems pluralistic, since arguers are not committed to the best 
option all along, but instead thoroughly explore the pros and cons of all of them in an open-
minded spirit. By contrast, advocacy seems monistic, in that one arguer accepts from the 
beginning only one position and is committed to defend it, while attempting to rebut contrary or 
contradictory positions. I myself distinguished between issue-based and role-based dialectics 
(Lewiński, 2012). In the former, pro and con arguments are connected to the issues discussed, so 
that arguers do not own a given line of argumentation or a position, and thus do not incur 
obligations to defend and attack a consistent position. In the latter, arguers need to fulfil their 
roles of proponents or opponents by standing behind their positions and defending them through 
an adversarial, yet rule-governed, procedure.  
 In either approach, putting Paul’s “inquirers” in the framework of adversarial 
argumentative discussion (see the very first sentence of his paper) is a category mistake.  
 Two upshots of this are: First, there is massive attention in argumentation theory to what 
procedures for argumentation do to arguments, including how they mitigate or aggravate biases. 
This work stretches from formal models (e.g., Walton & Krabbe, 1995, argumentation protocols 
in Artificial Intelligence), to general, “informal” theorising about argumentation designs. Sally 
Jackson (2015) has perspicuously analysed scientific method in terms of such designs. Here, 
again, the focus is not on the arguers’ attitudes or predispositions, but rather on how the 
procedure disciplines argumentation to make the attitudes and predispositions less relevant than 
we might think they are.  
 
Scientific argumentation, for example, is not defined by vernacular argument 
forms with scientific statements as their premises, but by use of scientific designs 
for reasoning that may depend on instrumentation, experimentation, computation, 
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and other invented techniques that are really only intelligible to a community of 
similarly trained experts. (Jackson, 2015, p. 249) 
 
The problem of bias and its mitigation is then shifted to the designs of discussions, not the 
designs of the discussants. Next to monists and pluralists there exist monist and pluralist 
procedures.  
Second, Paul might be talking about a specific sub-class of argumentative discussions – 
exactly those which have an ingrained monist bias in themselves (basically, a strict excluded 
middle design). When faced with a contradiction in her argument, or some other knock-down 
argument of an opponent, as Paul rightly infers, an arguer needs to abandon or at least revise her 
position (and possibly accept the opponent’s position), refute the criticism, or claim that she 
doesn’t like the (monist) game. The problem is that this covers only part of the notion of what 
argumentative discussion is. Another problem is that it might even not be a problem at all.       
 
4. Pluralism about monism  
 
Paul states that the “[d]ialectical bias is primarily a problem in circumstances in which the bias is 
not warranted” (p. 2). The bias—a predisposition to give more consideration to and defend a 
statement, likely driven by the conviction it is true or correct—can be unproblematic in many 
typical cases. I have a very strong bias towards the claim that 2 x 2 = 4, a strong bias towards the 
claim that Windsor, ON, is about 370 km away from Toronto, and a solid bias towards the claim 
that the climate change is anthropogenic. I am surely ready to stand to defend any of these with 
what I—and millions others—find cogent arguments. So how do we know the bias is warranted 
or not? Only an answer to this question creates the boundary conditions for Paul’s inquiry.  
 The standard distinction between the context of discovery and context of justification can 
take us some way.1 (Both Lewiński (2012) and Blair (2016) mention it as possible analogons of 
their distinctions.) During the discovery phase, one indeed would need to “give […] equal 
consideration to theories vying for our endorsement” (p. 2). And let us be agnostic over whether 
this is an “epistemic virtue” as Paul wants is, or a somewhat cynical “hedging of bets about 
which approach will lead to the complete and comprehensive account that supposedly awaits 
discovery” (Kellert, Longino, & Waters, 2006, p. xii). Here, the agnostic pluralist stance is 
almost a definitional must. Then, the question arises: what happens after the discovery is 
satisfactorily advanced, even compete (given whatever disciplinary standards) and inquirers 
move to the context of justification? Their agnostic pluralism can turn into a warranted monism 
or direct pluralism. In both cases arguers are fully justified, indeed required!, to be dialectically 
biased towards the best corroborated theory. That’s what they should be committed to and are 
paid for. In another scenario, the agnostic pluralism persists in the context of justification as 
some kind of a normative requirement on how to progress. And this seems to be only scenario 
Paul’s arguments really apply to. 
 Further, in this last scenario, two variants can be distinguished: there are complex cases 
that simply evade any monistic closure, such as quantum mechanics (Kellert et al., 2006). And 
there are cases where some failure of scientific method during discovery occurred. A scientific 
group is so much invested into their theory (prestige, grants, nice tenure positions), that they 
                                                 
1 Of course, in Kuhnian philosophy of science this distinction is abandoned, for the well-known reasons of the 
paradigm-dependence of empirical inquiries. But so is the idea that epistemic virtues of pluralistic impartiality and 
open-mindedness are ever attainable, or even desirable. 
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dismiss some contradictory evidence and pigheadedly defend their turf. Here, their justification 
in the context of dialectical advocacy—contest among competing theories—would always be 
flawed in the ways Paul described. But is it really a problem? And for whom?  
 Consider here Grasso’s (2016) response to Blair’s distinction between conditions for 
(good) open-minded inquiry and (possibly bad) dialectically-biased advocacy. She claims that 
properly, “systematically” designed argumentative models of inquiry (discovery) and advocacy 
would yield “almost indistinguishable results”: both “would require a comprehensive and 
exhaustive exploration of all possibilities: all options are considered in the discovery process, all 
voices are heard in the advocacy process” (Grasso, 2016, p. 71). Pluralism can thus be seen as a 
local feature of each arguer—or else a global feature of an argumentative situation. One virtuous 
pluralist can help us see the light—but so can a collection of warrying monists. A pig-headed and 
arrogant monist is so at her own peril. An onlooker can in fact pluralistically benefit from a fight 
of monists. If so, this is a problem for the monist arguer, but likely not for the scientific 
enterprise; a negative result is a result!    





Admittedly, it is next to impossible to make sweeping generalising claims here. (I tend to be 
agnostically pluralist about my conclusions on pluralism too.) Some forms of monist bias are 
simply unproductive, if not obnoxious: 
 
[…] monism on the part of researchers, especially when motivated by 
commitment to their chosen theory or approach, fuels sterile and unproductive 
debates. Adopting a pluralist attitude encourages scientists to pursue interesting 
research without having to settle questions that cannot, in the end, be settled. 
(Kellert et al., 2006, p. xx)   
 
By bringing up this issue, Paul very astutely points to the problem of what we do in 
argumentation theory, how we design techniques of individual bias-mitigation and models of 
argumentative debate which are not sterile and unproductive. I feel pretty monist about this being 
a crucial concern for all of us—not only because it interests me so much, but simply because it 
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